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John Oman has written :
We
are waiting today for some change in
philosophy away from Helegianism
and the process of thought as the key
to the universe, corresponding to the
movement of science away from Newtonianism, with its assumption of the
laws of motion as the efficient cause
of things."^
This statement reveals
two things : first, that Hegel is still
with us, and, second, that men who
think as Oman thinks wish he were
.

.

not.

influence has been greatly
under-rated precisely because his own
claims were so greatly over-stated.
Xever in the history of thought did
man
profess such exhaustive
any
knowledge and practical omniscience.
F. L. Patton, that master of verbal
caricature, states it this way : "When
Zopliar the Naamathite put the ques
tion to his class, 'Who by searching
can find out God?' an Hegelian, amid
the silence of the school, courageously
held up his hand."^ Again : "Here, as
a witty writer suggests, is a catasti ophe the reverse of that of Korah; the
earth has not swallowed up the man,
but the man has swallowed up the

Hegel's

universe."-'

Unfortunately,
though
no
one is
Hegel explained everything
sure he can explain Hegel. It seems
that a student brought a passage to
Hegel for explanation and the philos
opher replied : "When that passage
was written, there were two who knew
God and myself. Xow,
its meaning
�

alas!
1

there

is

but

one,

and

Naturalism and Supernaturalism,
pp. 107-108.

that

is

(Macmillan.

1931),
2

Fundamental Christianity,

p. 38.
3 Harris.

Samuel

(Scribners,

1887), p. 260.

The

(Macmillan, 1926),

Self -Revelation of God,
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God."
There

ing

was

than the

thing more surpris
stupendousness of Hegel's
one

claim and that was that his contempor
aries believed it! But they did, and
following a period of philosophical
inebriation came the morning after
and then the revulsion from which, it
seems, philosophers are still suttering.
When this revulsion set in, the phi
losophers not only threw out Hegel's

Hegel's wash, but they
threw out Hegel too. And it is proving
veiy difticult for him to get back again.
Hence, we hear much disparagement
and little appreciation. Xevertheless,
though Hegel's name may be anath
ema, many of his ideas, as Oman sug
gests, have become sacred.
Let us comment briefly on the
Hegelianism of two of the world's
N.
A.
philosophers,
outstanding
Whitehead and John
Op
iJewey.
tiie
men
is
to
as
of
these
each
posed
Absolute
Idealism
of
Hegel, they
nevertheless show striking alfinity for
The
his
fundamental
viewpoint.
German philosopher was most char
acteristically dissatisfied with any
thing lurking behind phenomena.
Thus, he refuted the substance theory
of Spinoza, the thing-in-itself of Kant
As
and the absolute of Schelling.
Weber has stated : "In Hegel, the
absolute is the process itself; it does
not produce movement and life, it is

baby

with

movement and life.""^

For Whitehead

and Dewey also process is reality. In
Process
and
the
former's
Reality
natural
order
existence and the
are
if
and
God,
ultimate,
anything, ap
its
to
be
product, certainly not
pears
4

Weber and Perry, History
(Scribners, 1925), p. 406.
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its

producer. Dewey's Quest for Cer
tainty is significant here. He deplores
the philosophical endeavor to find
abiding ideas and prefers to believe
in the world as flux or process. Thus
Dewey finds uncertainty, and Hegel a
kind of certainty, but the important
thing is that they look in the same
place. All of these philosophers find
nothing behind phenomena.

Hegel's
restricted

Rather,

as

influence
to

Dr.

is

by no
philosophical
Brightman says

means

circles.
:

It

speaks well for the power of reason today that
Hegel is still an influence in the world of affairs.
No Hegel, no Marx-Engels-Lenin ; no commun
ism and no socialist critique of communist dogma.
No Hegel, no Nazi theory of the state and no
Liebert to indict it. No Hegel, no Gentile to or
ganize the Fascist system of education and no
Croce to defy Mussolini. It is from Hegel that
Royce received much of his inspiration ; from
Hegel that Dewey took bis start, and to Hegel
he still looks as the greatest of the systematic
philosophers. 5

Nevertheless,

our

concern

in

this

paper is with Hegel's significance in
the realm of religion. Himself always

avowed Lutheran, Hegel's philos
ophy of Christianity was Janus-faced.
His identification of the content of
religion and of philosophy could be
If one is im
evaluated diversely.
an

pressed with the rational bulwark thus
provided for religion, as is Hocking,
conservative. If one is
impressed with the complete rational
izing of religion, the effect is radical.
Ahnost immediately after Hegel the
the effect

theologians
themselves

is

chose
into

up

right

sides, forming
and left wing

Hegelians.
Among the conservatives. Daub and
especially Biedermann are examples.
Daub could write that the sig-nificance
was
that he exhibited the
of God and re
incarnation
eternal
demption of the world in his own
pei'son as a historical fact. Thus he

of

unique sense.^
Biedermann supplemented Hegel by
teaching that religious faith was a
distinct element not to be equated
with or dissolved by reason. But this
was

the God-man in

a

faith presupposes revelation which it
discerns immediately.
H. R. Mac
intosh in Types of Modern Philosophy

describes Biedermann as
oi^her "who meant to be
but

the
as

philosHegelian

found Christ

possible,
always
in.'"'
ianity breaking
The radical wing found

as

in Feuerablest and
most devastating exponents.
Feuerbach reduced the absolute to man's
size and ultimately, as a materialist,
rejected all ideas including those of
God which he called "Wunchwesen"
or
wishful
thinking. In Strauss's
Leben Jesu, the pictures of Hegel have
become the "myths'" of Christianity.
In iilaiih^ nsleJirc, religion in general
seems
to
lose
its
savor.
Finally
Strauss asks himself, "Are we still
Christians?" and answers: "If we
would have our yea yea and our nay
nay, in short, if we would speak as
honest, upright men, we must acknowl
edge that we are no longer Christ
ians."^ Pfleiderer points out Strauss'
significance in the histoiy of Hegel
ianism.

bach

Two

and

Strauss

their

previous works

upon Immortality, the au
Richter and Feuerbach, were
reckoned among the Hegelian school, had indeed,
by the radical negative conclusions therein
reached by the application of this philosophy,
shaken the confidence generally felt in Hegelian

thors of which

are

orthodoxy; but
produced no very important
effect.
When, however, Strauss brouglit the
heavy artillery of his criticism, distinguished
equally by learning and penetration, to bear, first,
on the historical foundations of the
dogma itself
the unsubstantial fabric of Hegelian dogmatism
was within a few years
completely destroyed.9
.

.

.

( hiist

N., and B. E. Meland, Amer
Philfl'snphii's of Religion, (Willett, Clark &
Co., 1936), p. 319.
S

ican

139

In Wieman, H.

6

Pfleiderer, Otto, The Development of Theol
ogy, (Macmillan, 1890), p. 132.
7 H. R.
Macintosh, Types of Modern Philosohpy. p. 133.
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Quoted in Smith, H. B., Faith and Philosophy,
(Scribner, Armstrong & Co., 1877), p. 469.
9 The
Development of Theology. (Macmillan,
1890), p. 132.
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In

England Hegelianism prevailed
in a pure form at Oxford, but was
gradually watered down. In the class
room, Dr, Brightman once gave his
rating of some of the British thinkers
and this is the score if my notes do
not fail me: Bradley and Bosanquet,

100%

Hegelian ;
Pringle-Pattison,
Dr,
60%; Sorley, 40%; Ward, 0%.
Ralph Barton Perry, rather more glee
ful than sad, has a similar story to
tell:
Thus the weakness of Hegel, from the later
idealistic point of view, lies not in his general
programme, but in the fact that he boldly set
about carrying it out. He made too many pos
itive assertions. The fact that Hegel did make

positive assertions about natural evolution, about
historical development, and about international
politics, accounts for the fact that his philosophy
was

of vital consequence, and to many

source

a

of

inspiration. But today no one is more ready
than the idealist to point out that Hegel made
the mistake of forcing 'psychological' categories
upon nature and history. He tried to deduce the
actual cosmic process from the laws of spirit;
and it is now generally conceded that he failed.
Everyone but the idealist explains his failure by
the falsity of the project itself; but he attributes
it to the fact that Hegel's categories of spin;
were not purely logicalA^

JJl.

shall see, to overcome them by his
famous dialectical method
thesis and
antithesis taken up into {aufgehohen)
�

higher synthesis. Kierkegaard was
policeman who, as soon as he saw
the philosophical machine begin to
grind its gears, blew his whistle,
"Stop !" He was the champion of the
unresolved contradiction. For Hegel
religion was whole thought; for Kier
kegaard it was shattered thought.
Hegel relied on rationality; Kierke
gaard cast himself upon the irrational.
Hegel deified the intellect ; Kierke
gaard crucified it. For Hegel religion
was a steady climb; for Kierkegaard
a

the

it

was a

For

frantic

all

leap.^^

Kierkegaard's earnestness,

doubt that he ever truly liberated
himself from rationalism.
As John
Wild has pointed out.^^ Kierkegaard
asserts the good is unknowable and
paradoxical. But this is belied by
two things : first, he makes no appeal
to anything other than reason.
Sec
ond, his three stages imply that man
naturally comes to a knowledge of the
we

good.
The

Josiah

Royce, George

H,

Howison
stand as
modified

William E. Hocking
American
of
exponents
turned
his atten
Hegelianism. Royce
tion especially to the problem of the
individual and evil, while Howison
objected that Royce had not allowed
sufficient place for the individual self
and contended for a plurality of
selves. The place of feeling in Objec
tive Idealism is a particular concern
and

of

Hocking.
However,

be says, whatever is Christian is not
philosophical and whatever is philo

sophical is not Christian. His com
plete abhorrence of imnianentism and
utter
devotion
to
the
"absolutely
Other," is hostile indeed to Hegel's
God, who is in a very entangling
alliance with

the most significant mod
role of Hegelian religion is as
thesis
to
Kierkegaard's antithesis.
Hegel's was the original "both-and"
against which Kierkegaard thrust his
When Hegel was con
"either-or."
fronted with what appeared to be
ern

contradictions

spiritual seed of Kierkegaard,
Earth and Brunner, show the same
overt opposition to Hegel and the
"System." Earth's anathemas are in
no sense restricted to Hegel,
since, as

he

attempted,

10 Present
Philosophical Tendencies,
man's, Green & Co., 1925), p. 177.

as

we

(Long

this

woild

and

is

the

absolutely-not-Other,"
Erunner's opposition to Hegel is
rather more reasoned, which fact ac
counts
for Earth's distrust of it.
Fii'st, Brunner estimates Hegel's in
fluence :
11

Cf. esp. Philosophical Fragments, and Con
cluding Scientific Postscript.
12
"Philosophical Review," Vol. XLIX, No. 5,
Sept. 1940, p. 544.
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Since the time of Herder, Hegel, and Schleiermacher this scheme of a universal spiritual evo

lution, including also the Christian religion, has
become a sort of scientific axiom which anyone
who claims to be systematic must simply accept.
This thesis of idealism has been rendered un
objectionable to theology by the circumstance
that the conception of the individuality of
religions seemed to give due place to the peculiar
character of the Christian faith.l3

Then, he criticizes Hegel's position
fundamentally: "The decisive differ
ence, therefore, consists in the fact
that, for the idealist, the self-disclos
ure [of God] is fundamentally imme
diate, whereas for the Christian faith
it is fundamentally mediated."^"^
We pass

from

consideration
of Hegel's influence to date, back to
Hegel himself and especially his
philosophy of religion. The Alpha and
the Omega of Hegel's system is the
inclusiveness of the Absolute. Conse
quently his most frequently quoted
statement, "Das Wahre ist das Gauze"
is
eminently characteristic of his
now

a

thought. Being and all other categor
ies are to be regarded as constituting
In the Science of
the Absolute.
Logic, this view is set forth as the only
adequate one, all other ones being
Hegel's use of
inherently defective.
the term "Inbegriff" is significant.
The "Inbegriff aller realitat" is the
sum total of all reality and the allinclusive Begriff or concept. It is not
only a sum but a new entity, the whole
being more than the sum of its parts.^''
Hegel's universal is no mere abstrac
tion, because an abstraction is drawn
off from and excludes reality; but
Hegel's universal is concrete, includ
ing reality. Bosanquet devotes Lec
ture II of his Principle of Individualit if and Value to the explication of this
concept.
Because of the all-inclusive charac-

Absolute, Hegelians hesitate
to use the word "person." F. H. Brad
ley, for example, uses the designation
super-personal. Adherents of the Personalist School may regard Hegel's
Absolute as including not one, but
many persons, and feel that the Hegel
ian super-person though he may be
more than, is not other than person.
It is interesting to note, in passing,

ter of the

C.

13

Brunner, Emil, Philosophy of Religion,

by Farrer & Woolf, (Scribners, 1937),
I* Ibid.,
p. 40.

Encyclopaedic, �75.
16

^7

Vol. n, p. 456.
Ibid., p. 343.

p.

128.

S.

Lewis

thinks

coincidental.
Absolute includes all
things, it follows that all things re
veal the Absolute. Since all things are
revelations of the Absolute, the Ab
solute can be known. Since all things
constitute the Absolute and there is
nothing more, the Absolute may be
absolutely known. Hegel, in other
words, is champion of the knowability
of the Absolute and opponent of even
partial inscrutability. This is not
merely the logical conclusion of the
/'henonieiiologg and Science of Logic,

solute

are

Since

purely

the

but the

to hiw

prelude

Philosophy^ of

Religion.
observe this further before
commenting. The Absolute unfolds
itselt in the realm of concepts (cf.
Science of Logic and in the realm of
Let

us

(cf. Encyclopedia, ��245

nature

ff.)

realm of mind, or
spirit does the Absolute come to con
sciousness and freedom (cf. Encnfclobut

onlv

in

the

pedia, ��482ff.;

esp. 553ff.).
The Absolute unfolds itself in triadic

form also in the realm of spirit; first
in art, then in religion, and supremely
in philosophy. In art it appears in the
form of

trans.

of

God as
"beyond personality" and that Calvin
himself was almost tried for heresy
because he did not like the term
"persona" as descriptive of deity.
However, any similarity between the
latter's and Hegel's view of the Ab
that

objects which, although
art, are an impediment
purely rational perception by
sense

necessary for
to

a

more

refined manifestation

is found in the
stellungen) of

representations (Vor-

spirit.

A

religion

which

are
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picture-tlioughts partaking of tlie sen
suous because they are pictures and of
tlie rational because they are thoughts.
In philosophy the Absolute is seen
immediately as pure thought.
This brings us to grii)s with Hegel's
doctrine of revelation. Manifestly, his
gnosticism

was

a

great improvement
of

Kant and
Schelling. AV^e agree with jMaier in his
Hegel's Criticism of Kant in which he
shows that Hegel exposed the absurd
ity of Kant's talking about an object
which could not be brought in relation
to our consciousness. Kant's myster
ious underlying reality, having no
known qualities nt all, could not be
anvthing other than mind itself. This
over

the

agnosticism

and then proceeded to
conceive of mind as all that has being
and thereby made reality knowable by
itself.
Likewise, he indicates the

Hegel argued

futility of Sclielling's undifferentiated
Absolute, the hidden reality that in
cludes everything but in such abyssmal
darkness that nothing can be seen,
"the night in which all cows are
black." ^lure has pointed out that in
his intellectual optimism, Hegel is re
verting to the Greeks and away from
Kant's revolution by which, as Perry
says, the latter succeeded in "internal
izing reason." Hegel thought of Plato
and Aristotle as fundamentally the

and with them agreed that what
is most real is eo ipso, that which is
most
intelligible. The philosopher's
same

task,

Hegel

as

saw

it,

to

was

prove

tainty and

are

need

Hegel today.
who despair of all cer
profoundly skeptical of

respect,

To the liberals

we

of
demon stra bleu ess
would say, "In the mental

truth

the

there is

now an

infinite

.

.

he

spiritual
capable of

or
.

being communicated,"^* or, "the humil
ity which affirms that the finite cannot
know (lod
tion

to

nor

come

into direct rela

him, simply ascribes
p. 355.

powerlessness
known. "^^

make

to

himself

the

To

neo-orthodox, not
revelling in the irra
would say: "Things do not

to but

resigned
tional, he

agree with ideas because you are on a
level of thought where you cannot
take all things into account.
And

positivists and other secularists
of our day, he would say : "What
knowledge is v/ortli knowing if God be
to the

unknowable ?"^^
There

two

are

serious

Hegel's teaching concerning

defects in
revelation.

He makes too little of the

apparatus
receiving the revelation and too
much of general revelation itself. Even
Pfleiderer admits that Hegel's sole
reliance on thought as the recipient of
for

the revelation is unwarranted.

is

"Reli

of the
heart.
This criticism has been so
generally made that it has become a
cliche to classify Hegel as one who
exaggerated the intellectual element
in religion, alongside Kant who did
the same with the volitional element
and Schliermacher with the emotional.
need not elaborate.

gion

"^^

While

essentially

is

it

matter

a

conceded

that

Hegel

made too little of the apparatus for
receiving revelation, it has not been
especially noted that he made too
19

Philosophie d.er Religion, Vol. 1, p. 195,
quoted in Harris, Self -Revelation of God, p. 91.
20

Science

of Logic, Vol. H, p. 397.
Philosophie der Religion, Vol. I, p. 27.
22
Development of Theology, p. 73. Cf Strong,
Systematic Theology, p. 120. "Religion is not, as
Hegel declared, a kind of knowing for it would
then be only an incomplete form of knowledge,
and the measure of knowledge in such case would
be the measure of piety.
God is the subject
of religion as well as its object. Religion is God's
knowing of himself through the human con
sciousness. Hegel did not utterly ignore other
in
elements
religion. 'Feeling, intuition, and
faith belong to it,' he says, 'and mere cognition
is one-sided.'
'what knowledge is worth
he gave even
knowing, if God is unknowable.'
less place to the will than he gave to the emotions
and he failed to see that the knowledge of God
of which the Scripture speaks is a knowing, not
of the intellect alone, but of the \vhole man."
21

.

this.
In this

JR.
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much of

general revelation. It would

appear obvious that Hegel has oblit
erated the distinction between
general
and special revelation. If all
things
reveal the Absolute, because
they are
the

Absolute, there can be no such
thing as special revelation. What con
fuses the matter is that Hegel refers
to Christianity as absolute
religion
and calls it "revealed."'^ Dr.
Strong is
correct when he states that:
"Hegel,
in his Philosophy of
Religion, says
that Christianity is the only revealed

religion,
the only

because the Christian God is
one from whom a revelation

come."^'^

can

Nevertheless,

it should

be noted that this is

quibbling with
terminology.
True, Hegel believed
that the Christian conception of God
was the only adequate, viz.,
absolute,
one.
And only the Absolute could re
veal the Absolute. And so the Chris
tian God is the only one from whom
revelation could come. But that is not

the

equivalent

tians

the

of

saying

only
Christianity

were

ones

that
to

Chris
whom it

the only religion
in ii hich it came, which is the historic
teaching of the Church.
came

or

writer was once asked
to
demonstrate the fact that the church
has maintained the views here in
of special
dicated
revelation.
We
referred the questioner to Schaff's
three volume Creeds of Christendom
where anyone who runs may yet read
that the churches have uniformly tes
tified to a unique once-for-all revela
tion in no sense to be confused with
that natural revelation which is called
"common"
precisely because it is
universal and at all times present.
Let me give but one citation at ran
dom. In the Westminster Confession
of Faith, for example, we read :
The

Although the light of nature, and the works of
creation and providence, do so far manifest the
goodness, wisdom, and power of God, as to
leave men inexcusable; yet they are not sufficient
2i
24

Philosophy of Religion. Vol. II,
Systematic Theology, p. 27.

pp. 329-330.
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give that knowledge of God and of his will,
is necessary unto salvation; therefore it
to reveal himself, and to
pleased the Lord
to

which

...

declare

...

his will unto his Church.

revela
tion is unique, once for all revelation.
It occurred at one time and one place
and to one people and is no general
world phenomenon at all. The late Dr.
Machen, who is regarded by Wieman
and Meland,^^ as the outstanding rep
resentative of traditional supernatur
alism, stresses the strict historicalness
of Christianity:
In orthodox

thinking special

Christianity depends, not upon a complex of ideas,
but upon the narration of an event. Without that
event, the world, in the Christian view, is al
together dark, and humanity is lost under sin.
There can be no salvation by the discovering of
eternal truth.
A new face has been put upon
life by the blessed thing that God did when he
...

offered up His

only begotten Son.26

also, one of the ablest expon
neo-supernaturalism, sees
through the spuriousness of Hegel's
"special revelation," contrasting it
Brunner
of

ents

with the Christian view:
To him the idealist

history is merely a picturewhose
he
knows without the aid of
text
book,
him
the idea made concrete,
to
it
means
pictures ;
hence there is nothing decisive about it. In its
absolute and serious sense, there is no room here
for the category of uniqueness.
Hegel seemed
able to absorb history into thought as Plotinus
and Schelling did with Nature.27
.

.

.

is not deceived:

Oman, likewise,

Though Hegel's idea that in history
furnace what is

we see

in the

built into life as cold and
commonplace, was a great contribution to the
whole method of studying history, in the end real
history has no place in his intellectual construc
tion. What masquerades as history is a show
staged by dialectic, not history as a record of
man's slow, laborious, often mistaken, constantly
discouraged, learning from experience by the
real hazard of dealing with environment.28
now

We return to
2i

American

Hegel's exposition.

On

Philosophies of Religion, p. 62.
Christianity and Liberalism, p. 70.
27 The Mediator, trans,
by Olive Wyon, (Lut
terworth Press, 1934), pp. 36-37.
'2^ Naturalism and
Supernaturalism, (Macmil
lan, 1931), p. 291.
26
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the level of

religion,

the

dialectic,

GERSTNER,
of

course, moves through three stages.
The thetic stage is that of the univer
sal. God is the universal mind. When
this universal mind, which cannot
remain in this splendid isolation, sun
ders itself into particularity the anti
thetic stage is reached. This moment
corresponds to the various positive
religions. As a result of the union of
the universal and particular moments
the synthesis is achieved and we have
what
corresponds to the absolute

religion.
In Christianity, with which we are
primarily concerned, God is concrete
spirit the first moment of which is
God as He is before creation, the
second

God in creation, and the
third is God in the Church. In the
first, God, as the universal in itself, is
the

is

Father.

In

the

second, God,

as

particular, is the Son. In the third,
God, as individual, is the Holy

Spirit.29
The pure heresy of such a view of
the doctrine of the trinity is selfevident to anyone versed in the Bib
lical doctrine. Rather than submit my
own criticism I will cite McTaggart
on
this
testimony
point
insofar
as
especially significant
in comparing Hegelian
concern

whose
is

his

Trinitarianism
itarianism

is

and

Christian

purely academic,

Trin-

since

apparently he is not devoted to either
conception himself. As something of
a neutral observer, he regards Hegel's
Trinitarianism as missing the mark of
ecclesiastical Trinitarianism.
According

to

Hegel's exposition,

the

Father

and the Son are the Thesis and Antithesis of a
triad of which the Holy Ghost is the Synthesis.
It will follow from this that the Holy Ghost is
Insofar as the
the sole reality of the Trinity.
Father and the Son are real, they are taken as
correlative with the Holy Ghost, and as on the
same level with the latter, they are taken wrongly
and are not real. In other words, the Father and
the Son are simply abstractions which the thinker

29

pp.

Cf.

1,2.

Hegel, Philosdphy of Religion, Vol. Ill,

makes

from

JR.
the

concrete

reality of the Holy

Ghost.
This may be the correct doctrine of the Trin
ity, but it is not the usual one. It must be noticed
that it does not merely place the Holy Ghost
above the other two members of the Trinity,
but merges these latter in the Holy Ghost, which
is therefore not only the supreme reality, but
the sole reality God. And, again, the doctrine is
more than the assertion that the relation of the

members of the Trinity is not merely external.
Doubtless it is not merely external, but internal
and essential. But the point is as to the particular
sort of relation. The Father and the Son are
related to the Holy Ghost as something which
is they, and more than they. But the Holy Ghost
is related to the Father and the Son if it is to
be called a relation in a very different manner.
Each of them, so far as it is real at all, is the
Holy Ghost. But each of them is less than the
Holy Ghost. And so are both of them taken
�

�

together.30

McTaggart might
Hegel's doctrine was

have

certainly a piece
possibly an inversion

of

said

that

the procession of
the Father and the Son from the Holy
Spirit. Mackintosh does say : "This is

heterodoxy ;
of Church teach-

ing."^^
We have dealt with "God in His
eternal Idea in-and-for-self ; the King
dom of the Father." This phase of
Christian revelation Hegel associated
with the First member of the Trinity
and reserved for consideration the

other two members under the titles :
''The eternal Idea of God in the
element of consciousness and ordinary
thought, or difference; the kingdom of
the Son;" and "The Idea in the
element of the Church or Spiritual
(Community ; the kingdom of the
Spirit." It is with the latter two
divisions of the discussion that we are
now concerned.
Much in the manner of John's
statement that "no man hath seen God
at any time; the only begotten Son,
who is in the bosom of the Father, he
hath declared him" ; Hegel says : "this
Idea is now to be considered as it
^0

(University
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(T. & T. Clark,

Studies in Hegelian Cosmology,
Press, 1901), pp. 203, 204.

Hegel and Hegelianism,
1903), p. 259.
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appears in the second element, in the
element of manifestation in general."^^
\Vhat was latent in the universal,

namely differentiation,
patent in the
ferentiation

playing

a

it

does

of

not

becomes
Before, dif

now

particular.
"merely a movement,
love with itself, in which

was

to

be

otherness or
Other-Being in any serious sense,
nor
actually reach a condition of
separation and division.^^ Now, difderentiation has become entire other
ness:

get

external, independent, alienated,

diiierent.
Nevertheless, we are re
minded that the separation or differ
entiation is still not yet complete.
"What we have here is merely abstract
difference in general, we have not yet
got to ditference in the form which

peculiarly belongs to it."'''^
The Notion, which we have already
consists of three moments, now
into nature.
"The absolute
passes
freedom of the Idea means that in
seen

determining itself, in the act of judg
ment, or ditferentiation, it grants the
iree

independent

Other.

This

existence

of

the
thus

something
allowed to have an independent exist
ence, is represented by the AVorld
This
taken in a general sense."^^
transition is one of logical necessity

Other,

as

and is not to be confused with a teml)oral order although the term creation

maintains that Hegel
does not bridge the gap here between
the logically necessary and the tem
And
porally generated otherness.
alienation is the result of otherness.
Xevei'theless, alienation is not fully
manifested until nmn appears, for, as
is

used.

I'tleiderer

Setli

remarks,

the difference is not fully developed in
nature, which remains true to its own essence and
character, faithfully obeys its own laws, and does
not step outside of the substance, the necessity of
its being. Man, on the contrary, is called to be
.

.

.
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33
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on

the
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rather to become what he is essentially; it be
longs to the notion of him that he should place
himself over-against his nature, his present state,
and enter into the division between his essence
and his actual state. And his consciousness is it
self the act by which this division is set up, for
consciousness is the distinguishing of him, this
or

particular subject,
being.36

from

himself,

his

universal

Thus Hegel has a doctrine of the
fall but it is not the fall of man but
the fall of God. That is to say, God
finite or other, alienates
Himself from Himself.
This differ
entiated and finite self Hegel speaks
of as man and thinks of him by virtue
of his finitude and otherness as fallen,
as evil.

by becoming

potential Being, his
just in this his con
dition as one of natural Being that his defect is
found ; because he is Spirit he is separated from
his natural Being, and is disunion. One-sidedness
is directly involved in this natural condition.
VvIkh man is only as he is according to Nature,
Man

is

natural

by nature evil
Being, is evil.

;

his

It is

he is evil. 37

It would appear that "man" was born
falhm. I'^vil is not something alien to
his nature but of the essence. He was
born in sin and in iniquity did his God
conceive him. Because he was a free,

independent, particulai- being, he was
fallen being. It was not because he

a

misused his freedom but because he
used it ; not because he violated his
nature but because he expressed it,

fallen creature. When
Hegel's God rested from His creative
activity He saw everything that he
had made, including man, and, behold,
it was very bad.
This account of the Hegelian con
ception of evil is thus far one-sided
and inadequate. First of all, Hegel
conceives
of an
original state of
naturalness, a somewhat non-moral
state; and secondly, man even in his
fallen state is, in a sense, good as well
as evil. This is what provokes William
James' protest that Hegel "encourthat he

was

p. 35.
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JOHN H.

aged

men

to

see

than to make it

the world

good

GERSTNER,

rather

good."

This doctrine of evil
from the Absolute Spirit

proceeding
implies that

God himself includes evil. We have
here the reverse of Christian Science
reasoning. Mrs. Eddy argues: God is
all, God is good, therefore, all is good.
Hegel argues : God is all, all includes
evil, therefore, God is evil. Of course,
this conclusion is a logical one on
a pantheistic
presupposition. If the
Absolute is all-inclusive, as Hegel be
Consist
lieved, it must include evil.
ent as the conclusion may be, it is, as
ahMill believed, the reduction
surdissimum/'
To say that

man

is

by

nature

good

substantially to saying that
he is potentially Spirit, rationality,
that he has been created in the image
of God; God is the Good, and Man as
Spirit is the reflection of God, he is
the Good potentially.^^ With this qual
ification in mind, we may state again
that nmn although good in one regard,
yet is alienated from God by nature.
This condition of separation, however,
sets up a longing, a feeling in which
a
tendency to reunion is generated.
"In this division independence is set
amounts

up, and evil has its seat ; here is the
source of evil, but also the point from

which atonement ultimately arises. It
is both the beginning of sickness and
the source of health.'*�
sin and sin a
desire for reconciliation. As the prod
igal son became dissatisfied with his

Separation produces

loneliness and his swine's fare and
longed for the father's house where
there was plenty and to spare, so the
particular in the state of separation
requires reunion with the universal.

This desire is the tendency toward
reconciliation which is as much in the
nature of things as is the separation.
Finite minds are restless till they find
rest in the infinite mind. This recon
ciliation is realized when the infinite
assumes
finiteness.
This
logically

necessary, eternally recurr-ing move
ment of the infinite to the finite finds
doctrinal expression in the Incarna
tion and Death of Jesus Christ.
It is a proof of infinite love that God identified
Himself with what was foreign to His nature
in order to slay it. This is tiie signification of the
death of Christ. Christ has borne the sins of the
world. He has reconciled God to us, as it is

said.4i

The movement back from the finite
to the infinite is

Cf.

nature

40

n.

Pfleiderer, The Philosophy of
p.

106.
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even

to the extreme

death of the infinite.

point of the
death, how
infinity as

This
ever, is swallowed up in
God rises from death and

ascends

"This death is thus at once
finitude and in its most extreme form,
and at the same time the abolition and
absoiption of the natural finitude."'*^
By His Ascension to the right hand of
God, Christ, says Hegel, demonstrates
the dignity, worth, and identity of
human nature with that of the divine

again.

nature.

We have arrived at the stage where
the re-union has been effected. God
and Man are one again.
They had
been one from the beginning but their
diversity had been implicit. Now, after
having affirmed most emphatically.
and even tragically, their diversity

they re-affirm their unity, not in spite
of diversity but because of it.
The Spirit of God is in ]\lan but not
individual
presence is where
the

gathered together
or

41

Vol. ni, p. 46.

expressed doctrinally

in the Resurrection and in the Ascen
sion of Christ.
God assumes finite

in

Evcyclopaedie. �573; Mansel, Limits of
Rclig'.ous Thought, 3rd Edition, p, 46; and
Brightman, The Problem of God, (Abingdon
Press, 1930), p. 83.
39
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Ghost descended at Pentecost and be
came their immanent life.
Real and
present life in the Spirit of Christ,
that
is
Hegel's definition of the
Church.

Church's exposition as embodied in
the historic Church creeds? In spite
of many points of some similarity be
tween the Christian and Hegelian doc

In the

fundamental and radical. Hegel may
be correct but I doubt if it can be
maintained with any seriousness that
he is orthodox. His view of revelation
we have already sufficiently criticized.
Certainly his conception of the Trinity
is not that of the Church which be
lieves in a single substantial identity,
God, in which single substance there
are three Persons. The Hegelian Trin
ity is at most a ghost of this. In the
Hegelian deity the world is implicit,
or
at least the idea of an other is
implicit. The Church would question
first whether this otherness is a con
crete world at all; second, it would
deny that if it were a world it emanat
ed necessarily from the nature of God;
and, third, the Church affirms that
this "other" is not the world but the
Soil of God.
Again, according to the church, God
saw His world that is was
good, not
evil. Hegel's identification of finitude
and evil is a distinctly pagan concep
tion that, so far as I know, has never
found expression in a creed of any
orthodox Christian Church.
Hegel's
insistence that the world, including
man, is in a sense good does not offset
the radicalness of his departure from
the church at this point.
Lastly, if the Church and the Bible
be not in error then Christ came into
the Avorld to save sinners and not to
merge finitude in the infinite. Since
Hegel's conception of sin is different
from that of the Church, it follows
that his notion of grace and associated
doctrines must be diverge,
Christ
came not to call the finite to
repent
ance
but sinners;
not to preach a

Spiritual Community

as

actually existing,

the

Church is emphatically the institution in
virtue of which the persons composing it reach
the truth end appropriate it for themselves, and
through it the Holy Spirit comes to be in them as

real, actual, and present, and has its abode in
them; it means that the truth is in them, and
that they are in a condition to enjoy and
give
active expression to the truth or Spirit, that they
as individuals are those who
give active expres
sion to the Spirit.43
For

the Church is a "think
as
ing
loving and practical
communion. It thinks the contents of
the gospel narratives and of the Chris
tian sentiment in the form of the
Faith,"'^'^ Hegel's anti-Pietism is never
as

seen

Hegel,
well

more

work

clearly

or more

usefully

at

than

in
his insistence that
is
"dogma
necessary, and must be
as
valid
truth." It is not suffi
taught
cient that the Community feel, it must
also think. When the Son of Man
comes again, will He find
knowledge?
asks.
Hegel
Proper appreciation of the import
ance of the sacraments is evident to
Hegel. If he was not a Romanist,
neither was he a sectarian.
The Eucharist is the central point of the doctrine
Christianity, and the highest act of worship.
While, on the one hand, the constant preservation

of

of the Church

is the continued repetition of
life, passion, and resurrection of Christ in
the members of the Church, this, on the other
hand, is expressly accomplished in the sacra
ments of the Lord's Supper.
...

the

Thus he holds the Lutheran rather
than the Catholic or Zwinglian view.
We will

this

ity.

ask

one

final

question of

Hegelian exposition of Christian
HoA\'

does

it

compare

^Ubid., p. 124.
44 Sterrett,
J. MacBride,

Philosophy of

with

the

trine,

I fear that the differences

reconciliation
ethical one; not to make
God, but like unto God,

metaplwsical
Studies

Religion, p. 297.
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